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Introduction: The present study aims to contribute to our knowledge on the causes of variations in experienced
craving of (ex)smokers. The general idea is tested that when (ex)smokers are exposed to a smoking-cue, their
level of craving is determined by the momentary state of mind through which the smoking-cue is interpreted.
Methods:A cue-reactivity paradigm in temporary abstinent smokers is applied to trigger craving responses under
different experimentally induced states of mind. Craving is assessed with a three-item self-report measure. In
study 1 (N = 120) a self-afﬁrmation procedure is applied right before abstinent smokers were exposed to
their own smoking paraphernalia. In study 2 (N = 140) abstinent smokers received bogus feedback inducing a
high or low self-efﬁcacy and strong or weak positive outcome expectations.
Results: Study 1 showed a signiﬁcant interaction: When involvement was high, self-afﬁrmation increased the
level of craving but when involvement was low self-afﬁrmation lowered craving. Study 2 also showed a signiﬁ-
cant interaction: Only when the positive outcome expectation of smoking were high, self-efﬁcacy lowered the
level of craving. All analyses were controlled for the number of cigarettes smoked a day and number of past
quit attempts.
Conclusions: The present studies provide experimental evidence that levels of craving can be determined by
momentary states of mind. This theoretical perspective can be integrated in existing conditioning and social cog-
nitive learning perspectives on craving and substance use.© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Craving for the substance plays an important role in the mainte-
nance of drug use, such as cigarette smoking. Several studies show
that craving levels during the early phases of quitting are predictive of
later relapse (Baer & Lichtenstein, 1988; Brandon, Tiffany, & Baker,
1987; Dijksta & Borland, 2003; Killen & Fortmann, 1997; Shiffman
et al., 1997). In addition, cue-induced craving has been shown to be
related to smoking and relapse (Carpenter et al., 2009; Ferguson &
Shiffman, 2009; Waters et al., 2004). Because craving is deﬁned as a
motivational state (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Baker, Morse, & Sherman,
1986) that can be a cause of relapse, understanding the determinants
of craving is an important step in controlling relapse in smoking
cessation. Especially the observation of the moment to moment vari-
ance in craving of smokers and ex-smokers (Shiffman, 2009) is puzzling
and needs further explanation..menninga@pl.hanze.nl
. This is an open access article under1.1. Cue-reactivity
An important research paradigm for studying craving is that of cue-
reactivity. In this paradigm, smokers or ex-smokers are exposed to
smoking-cues to assess their reactions (Balter, Good, & Barrett, 2015;
Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Ferguson & Shiffman, 2009), and several sources
of (variance in) craving have been identiﬁed: To start with, levels of
craving are related to different (presentations of) smoking-cues, for ex-
ample, one's own cigarettes, a confrontation with another person
smoking one's favorite brand, or reading a script about being upset
and wanting to smoke badly (Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Niaura et al.,
1998). In addition, physiological factors inﬂuence the level of craving,
for example, individuals' heaviness of smoking (Carpenter et al., 2009;
Sayette, Martin,Wertz, Shiffman, & Perrott, 2001), and nicotine replace-
ment therapy (Waters et al., 2004). Furthermore, affect has been shown
to be related to craving (for a review Heckman et al., 2013). In more re-
cent years, cognitive factors have been shown to inﬂuence levels of
craving. For example, several studies show that expectations of
different kinds inﬂuence craving: Expectations about receiving actual
nicotine replacement or not (Schlagintweit, Good, & Barrett, 2014),
about whether a nicotine patch will be effective (Fucito & Juliano,the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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2012), and expectations about being allowed to smoke or not during
cue-exposure (Dols, Willems, van den Hout, & Bittoun, 2000; Dols, van
den Hout, Kindt, &Willems, 2002; Field & Duka, 2001). Also, cognitively
primed self-schemas (Shadel & Cervone, 2006), and antismoking adver-
tisements (Kang, Cappella, Strasser, & Lerman, 2009; Lee, Cappella,
Lerman, & Strasser, 2013) have been shown to determine levels of crav-
ing. Overall, several sources of the variance in craving have been
mapped.
The main theoretical framework to understand the variance in
craving has been the classical conditioning (or learned association)
paradigm: Situational cues that have been repeatedly paired with
smoking in the past elicit craving (Ferguson & Shiffman, 2009). In ad-
dition, social cognitive theories have been applied to understand the
occurrence and variance of craving (Brandon, Herzog, Irvin, &
Gwaltney, 2004; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Niaura, 2000). These
models deﬁne a sequence of psychological and physiological events
after exposure to the cue, including the activation of positive out-
come expectations of smoking. In essence, the social cognitive theo-
ries follow the conditioning paradigm but provide the “black box”
with more “content”, instead of only describing it in terms of auto-
mated, unconscious or associated relations. In these models the
strength – and thus the variance – of the craving primarily depends
on: 1) the strength of the conditioned link between the speciﬁc cue
and past smoking; 2) the strength of the positive outcome expecta-
tions that are activated. In the present study we try to understand
the variance in craving through another psychological model that is
less focused on conditioning but more on the psychological meaning
given to the smoking-cue, in the concept of the state of mind. This
theoretical perspective can be integrated with the above perspec-
tives, further shifting the focus from the stimuli to the psychological
processes that interpret the stimuli.
1.2. States of mind
We introduce a general higher level psychological framework of un-
derstanding the effects of smoking-cues on craving: The level of
craving depends on the activated state of mind through which
smoking-cues are perceived (not necessarily an affective state).
The state of mind may be caused by the smoking-cue itself, or by
other stimuli, independent of the smoking-cue. The state of mind
may be related to smoking (feeling conﬁdent to be able to abstain)
or general (feeling good about oneself). States of mind are conceptu-
alized as interpretative frameworks: The activated state of mind
directs attention and guides the interpretation of incoming
information (Erdley & D'Agostino, 1988; Kunda, 1999; Markus,
1977). According to Sedikides and Skowronski (1991), stimuli –
i.e., the smoking-cue – can be encoded as instances of the cognitive
structure that is the most highly active in memory. In mindset
priming this is demonstrated in a “carry-over” effect in which an ex-
perimentally activated state of mind determines the processing of
subsequently presented stimuli or tasks (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).
Thus, when trying to explain the effects of smoking-cues on craving,
wemust take into account how the smoking-cues are perceived: differ-
ent states of mind may give different meanings to the smoking-cues.
Within this framework we conducted two studies. The ﬁrst study tried
to demonstrate that the smoking-cue itself brings about a self-
regulatory cognitive reaction that determines the level of craving that
can be changed by inducing a state ofmind that is unrelated to smoking.
The second study tested whether states of mind can interact, in predict-
ed ways.
The ﬁrst study is conducted on the basis of the premise that the
smoking-cue itself induces a state of mind. When studying states of
mind it is essential to know what the starting point or the baseline is;
how do abstinent smokers perceive a smoking-cue when we do not in-
duce a speciﬁc state of mind? When an ex-smoker is exposed to asmoking-cue, contrasting thoughts, feelings, and goalsmaybe activated.
This state can be conceptualized as a motivational conﬂict (Baumeister
& Vohs, 2007) or a self-control conﬂict (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009),
and it needs resolution. This state not only concerns one's smoking
behavior, but also the person's self-image; it can be regarded as a self-
threat (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983). According to the self-
afﬁrmation theory, from an evolutionary point of view it is inadequate
and non-adaptive to have contradicting psychological states. When
the conﬂict state concerns the violation (i.e., smoking or wanting to
smoke) of an important value (i.e., health), the awareness of this con-
tradiction is conceptualized as a self-threat that is experienced as feel-
ing ashamed, dissatisﬁed and angry with oneself (Dijkstra & Buunk,
2008). The core of the self-afﬁrmation theory is that people try to get
rid of the self-threat: By defensively lowering the craving or its psycho-
logical causes, in reaction to a smoking cue, the self-threat may be
averted. From the perspective of the self-control conﬂict (Myrseth &
Fishbach, 2009), this defensive action can be seen as a conﬂict resolu-
tion that leads to lower temptations (Myrseth, Fishbach, & Trope,
2009) or as self-regulation in function of sticking to a goal
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). This reasoning is also consistent with
Niaura's (2000) Dynamic Regulatory Model of Drug Relapse, in which
initial responses to a smoking-cue may activate cognitive coping
reactions that feed back. The present study might reveal that people's
spontaneous levels of craving may already result from self-regulative
actions, mobilized by a conﬂict or self-threat. In addition, this study
will try to demonstrate this defensive self-regulation by inducing a gen-
eral state ofmind (i.e., unrelated to smoking) that can prevent defensive
self-regulation.
The second study is designed to test the notion that states of mind
interact with each other. To make a next step in understanding the
effects of states of mind, and further approach the complex and seem-
ingly fuzzy reality, two states of mind will be induced to see whether
they show synergistic effects. The social cognitive perspective of
smoking and relapse may help deﬁne relevant states of mind that
might determine how smoking-cues are perceived. In this perspective,
two constructs are relevant: Positive outcome expectations of smoking
and self-efﬁcacy expectations to be able to refrain from smoking
(Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Niaura, 2000). Positive outcome expectations
of smoking refer to smokers' anticipated positive effects of smoking
(Doran, Schweizer, & Meyers, 2011; Ikard, Green, & Horn, 1969;
Niaura, Goldstein, Ward, & Abrams, 1989; Tate & Stanton, 1990; Urban
& Demetrovics, 2010; Wetter et al., 1994). According to Marlatt and
Gordon (1985), positive outcome expectations are at the basis of crav-
ing: “…craving is a motivational state associated with a strong desire
for an expected positive outcome” (pp. 138). Therefore, it is safe to pre-
dict that when smokers anticipate strong positive outcomes of smoking
at themoment that they are exposed to smoking-cues, theywill experi-
ence stronger craving.
Besides positive outcome expectations, self-efﬁcacy expectations
play a role in smoking and relapse. In the framework of craving to
smoke, self-efﬁcacy expectations concern the perceived personal ability
to be able to not give in to the craving. Self-efﬁcacy has been shown to
be related to relapse in many studies (Gwaltney, Metrik, Shiffman, &
Kahler, 2009). In addition, self-efﬁcacy can be expected to lower craving
when it strengthens the individual's expectation to refrain from
smoking in a speciﬁc situation (Dols et al., 2000, 2002). In further sup-
port of this notion, empirical studies show a negative relation between
self-efﬁcacy and craving (Dijksta & Borland, 2003; Shadel & Cervone,
2006). It is expected that when smokers have a high self-efﬁcacy at
the moment that they are exposed to smoking-cues, they will experi-
ence less craving.
Thus, positive outcome expectations and self-efﬁcacy expectations
both provide different but related interpretative frameworks. They
refer to appraisals of different aspects of the smoking-cue. It is tested
here whether these appraisals get mixed, to form a new synergistic ap-
praisal of the smoking-cue that inﬂuences craving.
1 The original design also included a manipulation of self-control: Participants were
asked to brieﬂywrite about a situation inwhich they had shown to have control over their
impulses, or not. However, thismanipulation seemed to have failed or to be inert as it was
not signiﬁcantly related to craving, not as amain effect andnot in interactionwith involve-
ment or self-afﬁrmation. Therefore, we do not present these data.
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In two laboratory experiments, the general idea is tested that when
smokers are exposed to a smoking-cue, the smokers' state of mind at
that moment inﬂuences the level of craving. In study 1, we assume
that the mere exposure to the smoking-cue (while not being allowed
to smoke yet) will induce a psychological conﬂict that leads to a self-
control response that inﬂuences the level of craving. A self-afﬁrmation
procedure is applied in half of the participants to prevent the need to
self-regulate. In study 2, two smoking-speciﬁc states of mind based on
the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) are induced: Before
smokers are exposed to the smoking-cue (while not being allowed to
smoke yet), they are led to belief that smoking has few versus many
positive outcome expectations or that they have a high versus a low
self-efﬁcacy to refrain from smoking. In both studies, abstinent smokers
are confronted with their own cigarettes to trigger craving right after
they have been exposed to the respective experimental manipulations.
The self-reported craving during the exposure to the smoking-cue is the
dependent measure.
2. Study 1
In this study, we argue that the mere exposure to the smoking-cue
will lead to a defensive state of mind that lowers craving, at least
when the (ex)smoker's goal to refrain from smoking is activated
(Stroebe, Koningsbruggen, Papies, & Aarts, 2013). To test whether this
is true, we can apply a procedure of which we know that it takes away
such a defensive reaction in function of lowering a self-threat: A self-
afﬁrmation procedure. A self-afﬁrmation procedure is applied before
people are confronted with stimuli (Critcher, Dunning, & Armor,
2010), in the present case, with their own smoking paraphernalia. In a
self-afﬁrmation procedure, important individual characteristics of par-
ticipants are afﬁrmed (McQueen &Klein, 2006). The effect is that partic-
ipants feel good about themselves; the procedure makes participants
realize that their self-worth does not hinge on temporary or situational
evaluations of their self-image. Therefore, a self-afﬁrmation procedure
induces a psychological state of “open-mindedness”. The effect is that
people dare to face the potential threat and they accept the threat with-
out denial (Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Thus,
when abstinent smokers are afﬁrmed before they are exposed to
smoking paraphernalia, they will no longer have the inclination to re-
duce the self-threat using a defensive reaction: They accept the aversive
feelings caused by the confrontation and they have no longer the need
to lower the craving or its psychological causes to protect their self. As
a result, the self-afﬁrmation procedure will lead to an increase in
craving.
However, not all smokerswill showadefensive reaction to lower the
cravingwhen they are exposed to smoking-cues, so, the self-afﬁrmation
procedure will only increase craving in some people. Especially people
who are highly involved will display a defensive reaction that can be
prevented by a self-afﬁrmation procedure (Eagly, 2007; Liberman &
Chaiken, 1992). In the present context involvement concerns the in-
volvement in the issue of quitting smoking; especially these smokers
may experience the conﬂict that they will try to resolve. Therefore, es-
pecially in highly involved ex-smokers a self-afﬁrmation can be expect-
ed to prevent this defensive reaction (Harris & Napper, 2005; Reed &
Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman,Nelson, & Steele, 2000) and lead to increased
(acceptance of) craving.
2.1. Participants
120 smoking students participated in this study for a payment of 15
euros each. All participants were temporary abstinent smokers, because
ex-smokers could not be included: We think that it is unethical to se-
duce ex-smokers to smoke in an experimental procedure. Participantswere instructed to stay abstinent for at least 4 h before the start of the
experiment.
2.2. Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in a study about smoking and
smoking behavior. When participants entered the lab-room, they were
asked to hand in their cigarettes. Participants were told that this was
done because they “needed” the cigarettes later in the experiment.
After this, participants were seated behind a computer (separate
cabins). Before the participants were exposed to anymanipulation, pre-
test measurements were conducted. After ﬁnishing the pretest, they
were randomly assigned to a self-afﬁrmation or a no-self-afﬁrmation
condition.1 After the manipulation, participants were exposed to the
smoking-cue, during which they answered the posttest questions that
comprised the dependent measures.
2.3. Materials and measures
2.3.1. Pretest measures
Participants started with questions about gender, age, education
level and smoking status and history.
Involvementwasmeasuredwith a scale comprised of two questions
(r (120) = .33, p b .001): ‘How important is quitting smoking to you?’
and ‘How important is your health to you?’ (endpoints ‘not at all impor-
tant’ (1) and ‘very important’ (7)). The higher the score, the higher the
involvement in the topic of smoking and smoking cessation is thought
to be.
2.3.2. Self-afﬁrmation manipulation
The self-afﬁrmation procedure was offered before participants were
exposed to the smoking-cue and it was based on Allport, Vernon and
Lindzey's (1960) study of values (Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, &
Dijksterhuis, 1999). Participants were asked to indicate on a list of six
domains, the domain they value the most and the domain they value
the least. The domainswere religion, politics, social aspects of life, econ-
omy, esthetics, and theory. Next, in the self-afﬁrmation condition partic-
ipants were offered ten questions with one of two answering options
always referring to the domain they had indicated to be themost impor-
tant for them. For example, when the participant had indicated that he
or she most valued the social aspects of life, a question could be: “Who
contributed the strongest to mankind progress? 1) Newton, because of
his theoretical mechanics or; 2)Martin Luther King, human rights ﬁght-
er”. In the non-self-afﬁrmation condition, participants were offered ten
questions about their least important value. This self-afﬁrmation proce-
dure has been shown to signiﬁcantly lower defensive reactions towards
a health persuasive message (Dijkstra & Van Asten, 2013).
2.3.3. Smoking-cue exposure
After the manipulation, participants were instructed to ask the ex-
perimenter for their cigarettes. Participants who didn't bring their ciga-
rettes (26 participants), borrowed their favorite brand (or a brand that
resembled their own brand) from the instructor. They were asked to
rate the ﬂavor of the cigarettes. The exposure to smoking paraphernalia
has been shown to be a robust procedure for inducing drug related reac-
tivity (Carter & Tiffany, 1999).
2.3.4. Posttest measures
After and during the smoking-cue exposure – their cigarettes lying
in front of them and not being allowed to smoke – their craving was
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9-point scales. The items were: ‘Do you feel like smoking right now?’;
‘At this moment, do you look forward to lighting and smoking a ciga-
rette?’; ‘How strongly do you desire to smoke right now?’ (endpoints
‘not at all’ (1) to 9 ‘verymuch’(9)). The three item scores were averaged
to form the individual craving score (Cronbach's α= .96).
To check the self-afﬁrmation manipulation, participants were asked
how many positive thoughts they had during the experiment. Positive
thoughts are considered to reﬂect acceptance of the incoming informa-
tion (Petty,Wells, & Brock, 1976): ‘Howmany positive thoughts did you
have during this experiment?’ (endpoints ‘very few positive thoughts’
(1) and ‘very many positive thoughts’ (7)).
2.4. Results and discussion
2.4.1. Participant characteristics
Themean age of the 120 smokerswas 21.22 years (SD=2.27), with
a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 28 years. 52.6% was women.
Smokers smoked on average 12.0 cigarettes a day (SD= 4.33).
2.4.2. Manipulation check
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test
whether the self-afﬁrmation manipulation was effective. Participants
in the self-afﬁrmation condition reported signiﬁcantly more positive
thoughts (M = 4.70, SD = 1.27) than participants in the no self-
afﬁrmation condition (M= 4.08, SD= 1.18), F(1, 118) = 7.59, p b .01.
2.4.3. Interaction effects on craving
The interaction between involvement and self-afﬁrmation was test-
ed using ANCOVAwith craving as a dependent variable and the number
of cigarettes smoked a day and the number of quit attempts as covari-
ates. This two-way interaction was signiﬁcant, (F(1114) = 13,01,
p b .001, ηp2 = .102). To investigate the meaning of this interaction,
the main effect of self-afﬁrmation was tested when involvement was
low and when involvement was high. To this purpose, the complete
dataset was used to model a group scoring low on involvement and a
group scoring high on involvement, by adding and subtracting 1 stan-
dard deviation from the mean-centered mean, respectively (Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
As expected, among highly involved abstinent smokers self-
afﬁrmation signiﬁcantly increased the reported craving (p b .05;
Fig. 1). This suggests that when highly involved participants were
afﬁrmed, they were able to face the self-threat and the causally related
craving; no self-regulatory mechanisms were needed anymore. This
effect of self-afﬁrmation implies that when participants were not
afﬁrmed, they applied self-regulatory defenses, presumably to cope
with the threat induced by the smoking-cue. This notion is supported
by the signiﬁcant relation (p b .01) between involvement and craving
when participants were not afﬁrmed: Lower involvement, meaning
less defensiveness, was related to higher craving. Thus, especially in
the high involved the smoking-cue activated self-regulatory defenses
that could be prevented by self-afﬁrmation.Fig. 1. The effects of involvement and self-afﬁrmation on craving.Among low involved participants the self-afﬁrmation procedure led
to a signiﬁcant drop in craving (p b .01), meaning that inducing open-
mindedness led participants to report lower craving. It may be that
low involved participants experienced a lower self-threat because of
their low involvement and, therefore, did not feel the need to get
defensive. They may have used a “default” emotion regulation to face
the cue. However, when these participants were enticed to process
the information on the smoking-cue open-mindedly by applying the
self-afﬁrmation procedure, the threat may have become too strong to
face. Such a reaction to an “overload” of threat is well documented in
the ﬁeld of persuasion (Block & William, 2002; Burnkrant & Unnava,
1995; Meyers-Levy & Peracchio, 1996; Na, 1999). Moreover, Reed and
Aspinwall (1998) also showed that in low involved participants, the
effects of self-afﬁrmation were the opposite of the effect in highly in-
volved participants. Although this reasoning has its basis in theories
and studies on persuasion, the three core elements of our theorizing –
a threat, a level of involvement, and a defensive reaction to lower a
cause of the threat – also play a central role in these studies on persua-
sion. Lastly, when participants were afﬁrmed, lower involvement was
signiﬁcantly related to lower craving (p b .05). Because all analyses
were corrected for smoking and quitting behavior, we assume that the
low craving in the low involved participants is not caused by less
physical reactivity.
The ﬁnding that self-afﬁrmation increases craving when involve-
ment is high, is explained by self-afﬁrmation taking away defensive-
ness. However, it is possible that self-afﬁrmation also has other effects.
That is, because self-afﬁrmation should afﬁrm and boost the self, it
might take away negative emotions (Tesser, 2000). However, in that
case it could be expected that self-afﬁrmation would lower craving,
not increase it. Among the low involved this interpretation would
hold, and it cannot be ruled out that self-afﬁrmation might work differ-
ently in low and high involved. Future studies can further disentangle
the effects of self-afﬁrmation.
We assume that in the no-afﬁrmation condition smokers perceived
the smoking-cue through a default or spontaneous state of mind: This
speciﬁc no-self-afﬁrmation manipulation is designed to be neutral and
it can be expected to be inert. These data, therefore, suggest that there
are relevant individual differences among abstinent smokers that deter-
mine craving in smoking-cue studies that are never taken into account:
The present study suggests that when people are not afﬁrmed, the ex-
tent to which they are involved in the issue determines their level of
craving. Not addressing these individual differences may obscure or
bias effects of smoking-cues. Therefore, smoking-cue reactivity studies
might always need to include such individual difference measures.
3. Study 2
In this second study the possible interaction between two smoking
speciﬁc states of mind – positive outcome expectations of smoking
and self-efﬁcacy expectations with regard to refraining from smoking –
will be addressed. On the basis of the relations of positive outcome ex-
pectations of smoking and self-efﬁcacy expectations on the one hand
and craving on the other hand, as reviewed in the introduction, we
might expect the following effects: When self-efﬁcacy is low, stronger
positive outcome expectations will lead to more craving. When self-
efﬁcacy is high, this will be prevented.When positive outcome expecta-
tions are weak, self-efﬁcacy expectations will not further lower the
craving, but when positive outcome expectations are strong, self-
efﬁcacy expectations will lower the craving.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants and design
140 smoking students participated in this study for a payment of 15
euros each. The same procedure and inclusion criteria were used as in
study 1 (e.g., they had to be abstinent for at least 4 h).
Fig. 2. The effects of self-efﬁcacy and smoking expectations on craving.
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(weak versus strong positive outcomes) × 2 (low versus high self-
efﬁcacy)-design. Thus, in total four different states of mind were in-
duced. A state of mind was induced by providing the participants with
bogus feedback that was said to be based on the pretest measurements.
3.2. Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in a study about smoking and
smoking behavior. When participants entered the lab-room, they were
asked to hand in their cigarettes. After this, participants were seated
behind a computer (separate cabins). Before the participants were ex-
posed to any manipulation, pretest measurements were conducted.
After ﬁnishing the pretest, participants received condition speciﬁc
bogus feedback regarding their self-efﬁcacy (high or low) to quit
smoking and regarding their positive outcome expectations (strong or
weak). After the manipulation, participants were exposed to the
smoking-cue, during which they answered the posttest questions that
comprised the dependent measures.
3.3. Materials and measures
3.3.1. Pretest measures
Participants started with questions about gender, age, education
level, smoking status, and smoking history.
Following this, participants answered twenty-eight ﬁller questions
about health and health behavior (on a 5-point “I do not agree” (1)–“I
do agree”-scale) with two aims. Firstly, the items were meant to dis-
guise the assessment of self-efﬁcacy and positive outcomeexpectations;
the items of these measures weremixed with the ﬁller items. Secondly,
participants were told that the feedback they receivedwas based on the
pretest scores. By designing theﬁller questions as ambiguous (itwasnot
immediately clear what they assessed), it was thought to support the
perceived reliability of the feedback participants would receive. Two
examples of ambiguous questions are: ‘Smokers choose to smoke’ and
‘Smokers are no junks’. The actual measure of self-efﬁcacy concerned
the ability to resist the temptation to smoke in six situations, presented
after the statement: ‘It is hard to refrain from smoking when…’:
‘someone offers you a cigarette’; ‘you've just ﬁnished yourmeal’; ‘you're
feeling down’; ‘you are going out or having a party’; ‘you're taking a
break’; ‘you're feeling stressed’. Themeasure of positive outcome expec-
tations concerned ﬁve possible outcomes of smoking presented after
the statement: ‘Smoking helps me to…’: ‘cope with anger’; ‘cope with
stress’; ‘concentrate’; ‘relax’; ‘stay alert’.
3.3.2. Manipulations
After participants ﬁlled in the pre measurement they received the
condition-speciﬁc bogus feedback that comprised the main manipula-
tion. Participants were instructed to carefully read the feedback text.
3.3.3. Self-efﬁcacy manipulation
In the low self-efﬁcacy condition participants were led to believe
that on the basis of the pre measurement it seemed that they had a
low self-efﬁcacy to quit smoking: The chance to successfully quit
smokingwas said to be quite low for them, and if theywould undertake
a quitting attempt, theywould give up easy (61words). In the high self-
efﬁcacy condition, participants were led to believe that they had a high
self-efﬁcacy to quit smoking: Their chance to successfully quit smoking
was high, and if they would undertake a quit attempt, they would not
give up (60 words).
3.3.4. Positive outcome expectations manipulation
In the weak positive outcome expectations condition, participants
were led to believe that that on the basis of the pre measurement it
seemed that they saw few beneﬁts of smoking, that smoking was
more of a habit to them, and that it had no important function forthem. In addition, it was stressed that, indeed, smoking has no beneﬁcial
effects whatsoever (63 words). In the strong positive outcome expecta-
tions condition, participants were led to believe that they saw strong
beneﬁts of smoking and that smoking had important functions for
them. In addition, it was stressed that, indeed, smoking has strong
beneﬁcial effects (60 words).
3.3.5. Smoking-cue manipulation
After reading the bogus feedback, the participants were exposed to
their cigarettes, using the same procedure as in Study 1. Thirty-eight
participants did not bring their own cigarettes.
3.3.6. Posttest measures
The craving measure was the same as used in Study 1 (Cronbach's
α= .96). To check the manipulations, self-efﬁcacy and positive out-
come expectations were assessed with short measures, using the
following two items on a 7-point scale: ‘Are you able to quit
smoking?’(endpoints ‘not at all able to’ (1) and ‘deﬁnitely able to’(7))
and ‘Does smoking have positive outcomes for you?’ (endpoints ‘no
positive outcomes at all’ (0) and ‘many positive outcomes’ (7)).
3.4. Results and discussion
3.4.1. Participant characteristics
Themean age of the 140 smokers was 22.34 years (SD=2.37), with
a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 28 years. 65.7% were women.
Participants smoked 14.65 cigarettes a day on average (SD= 4.81).
3.4.2. Manipulation check
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test
whether themanipulations of self-efﬁcacy and the positive outcome ex-
pectationswere effective. Participants in the high self-efﬁcacy condition
reported higher self-efﬁcacy (M=5.29, SD=1.27) than participants in
the low self-efﬁcacy condition (M=4.91, SD=1.31), but the difference
only approached signiﬁcance, F(1, 138) = 3.07, p= .08. Participants in
the low positive outcome expectations condition reported less positive
outcomes (M= 3.73, SD= 1.35) than participants in the high positive
outcome expectations condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.37), F(1, 138) =
4.97, p b .05. It is concluded that the manipulations were partly
successful.
3.4.3. The interaction effect on craving
A 2 (low/high self-efﬁcacy) × 2 (weak/strong positive outcome ex-
pectations) ANCOVA with craving as dependent measure and number
of cigarettes smoking and number of quitting attempts as covariates
showed no signiﬁcant main effects of the self-efﬁcacy manipulation
and of the positive outcome expectations manipulation. However, the
interaction between the self-efﬁcacy and the positive outcome expecta-
tions manipulations on craving was signiﬁcant, F(1, 132) = 10.12,
p b .01, ηp2= .07. To testwhether this effect existed beyond participants'
level of self-efﬁcacy and positive outcome expectation at pretest, the
pretest measures of self-efﬁcacy and positive outcome expectations
were included in themodel as covariates. The model parameters hardly
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were beyond the individual difference before the manipulation. Fig. 2
shows the mean scores on craving in the four conditions.
It was expected that higher self-efﬁcacy would be related to lower
craving and stronger positive outcome expectations would be related
to stronger craving. However, both effectswere only present under con-
ditions: Contrast analyses showed that only when self-efﬁcacywas low,
stronger positive outcome expectations led to signiﬁcantly stronger
craving (p b .05). In addition, only when positive expectations were
strong, higher self-efﬁcacy led to lower craving, although this effect
only approached signiﬁcance (p= .076). Unexpectedly, when smokers
sawweak positive outcome expectations, higher self-efﬁcacywas relat-
ed to stronger craving, although this effect was not completely signiﬁ-
cant (p = .055). Thus, only in the case of strong positive outcome
expectations, self-efﬁcacy seemed to do its craving-lowering work. It
looks like self-efﬁcacy became only relevant or was only mobilized
when the temptation to smoke (on the basis of strong positive outcome
expectations) was “alarmingly” high; only then self-control based on
the sufﬁcient level of self-efﬁcacy was triggered to lower the craving.
These data show that smoking-cues can be processed through a state
of mind that consists of a combination of different meaning giving per-
ceptions. Thus, explaining reactions towards smoking-cues needs a
complex theoretical framework in which states of mind not necessarily
work additive but also interactive. Moreover, there is no reason why
even higher order interactions could not occur. Future studies should
further address these interactive effects of these states of mind on
craving.
The effects of the experimental manipulations existed beyond the
individual differences on self-efﬁcacy and positive outcome expecta-
tions and the number of cigarettes smoked a day and the number of
past quit attempts. The manipulation checks revealed that we were
able to induce lower and higher levels of self-efﬁcacy expectations and
positive outcome expectations. These data provide further evidence
that self-efﬁcacy and positive outcome expectations play an important
role in craving and the relapse process, in concert (Gwaltney,
Shiffman, Balabanis, & Paty, 2005; Niaura, 2000; Shadel & Cervone,
2006).
4. General discussion
Although several questions remain unanswered, we demonstrated
that different states of mind elicit different levels of craving. These
effects were found independent of participants' quitting and smoking
behavior and holding the smoking-cues constant (one's own ciga-
rettes). In this context a state of mind refers to all kinds of psychological
states that inﬂuence how smoking-cues are perceived. For example,
smoking-cues may be seen as a threat to one's health, as a threat to
one's self-regard, as an obstacle to abstinence, or no longer important
enough to take the risk.
In study 1 a general, well-deﬁned not smoking-related state of mind
was induced: Self-afﬁrmationwas thought to induce open-mindedness,
and its effects here revealed the presence of defensive a state of mind
that was evoked by confrontation with the own cigarettes in highly in-
volved abstainers. This state may be equivalent to the demonstrated in-
creased neural activity in the prefrontal cortical regions of ex-smokers
during exposure to a smoking-cue (Nestor, McCabe, Jones, Clancy, &
Garavan, 2011). The state of being self-afﬁrmed inﬂuenced the percep-
tion of the smoking-cue, but it can be expected to also inﬂuence the per-
ception of other stimuli (Correl, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004; Wakslak &
Trope, 2009). In study 2, the states of mind were related to smoking:
Expecting strong or weak positive effects of smoking or experiencing
control or not over smoking. At the moment of exposure to their
cigarettes, these states of mind – also in interaction with each other –
determined how smokers perceived the smoking-cue. All in all, these
data suggest that craving can be inﬂuenced by smoking-related as
well as by general states of mind.The states of mind inﬂuenced craving beyond the number of
cigarettes smokers smoked a day: All analysiswere controlled for the in-
ﬂuence of this most important potential confounder. This strongly sug-
gests that craving, as assessed in the present studies, is not only
determined by biological factors but also has more varying or volatile
psychological causes. In addition, the present states of mind framework
may be positionedwithin the conditioning and social cognitive perspec-
tives of craving between the stimulus and the reactions, thereby more
explicitly incorporating the basic importance of psychological processes
in giving meaning to all incoming information (Bandura, 1986; Beck,
1995; Frijda, 1986). In these perspectives of craving and drug use, a
stimulus triggers craving but this relation (at least in social cognitive
models) is mediated by physiological and psychological processes. For
example, in Niaura's (2000) Dynamic Regulatory Model affect or
contextual stimuli trigger a chain of subsequent reactions, possibly in-
cluding the activation of outcome expectations, coping reactions and re-
lapse. The state of mind perspective can be positioned in-between the
stimuli and the reaction chain: States of mind determine what smokers
“see”when they are exposed to a smoking cue, and they determine the
subsequent reaction chain; the physiological and psychological process-
es that are triggered.
The present theorizing implies that when ex-smokersmove through
their environments encountering smoking-cues, their craving reactions
towards the same stimulimay strongly differ frommoment tomoment:
Talking to another ex-smoker may temporarily make salient one's
accomplishments (e.g., “I am already refraining from smoking for ten
days now”), and bring about a state of mind of high self-efﬁcacy,
while the confrontation with a tobacco advertisement may bring
about a state ofmind of expecting strong positive outcomes of smoking,
and a subsequent self-afﬁrming conversation may make the ex-smoker
open-minded. These states of mind can be expected to lead to different
levels of craving in reaction to the same smoking-cues. From a meta-
cognitive point of view this may have subsequent effects on smokers'
motivation to invest in their quitting attempt. That is, ex-smokers
with the ﬁnal goal of continuous abstinence are thought to search for
feedback on whether they are on the right track; they want to know
whether their efforts are paying off (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), and
whether their self-regulation is adequate (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007).
Fluctuating levels of craving may lead to uncertainty on how well
their quit attempt is going, thereby undermining their motivation to in-
vest and persevere (Menninga, Dijkstra, Gebhardt, & Siero, 2011). The
large variation in craving in quitters throughout the day may also ex-
plain why craving is – according to Wray, Gass, and Tiffany (2013) –
not consistently related to treatment outcomes: The commonly used
craving measures may not grasp all changes in craving. In addition,
one reason why the level of craving can be low is that the abstainer
experiences a strong conﬂict in reaction to a smoking-cue, and
subsequently down-regulates the craving. However, the low craving
may wrongly suggest that the abstainer is not moved by the cue.
This might partly explain why it is hard to predict abstinence or
treatment outcomes from measurements of craving. These notions
might be addressed in future studies on the relation between craving
and relapse.
The results of the present studies should be interpreted against the
background of the methodology, of which the measure of craving is an
important aspect. We assessed craving with a three-item self-report
measure on the desire and inclination to smoke. This measure does
not assess physiological aspects of craving, nor does it explicitly com-
prise the anticipation of positive outcomes of smoking. It is meant to
be a parameter of the psychological experience (the desire) of being
pulled towards smoking. The use of brief self-report measures of crav-
ing, even 1-item measures, is very common in cue-exposure research
(Baumann & Sayette, 2006; Carpenter et al., 2009; Dols et al., 2002;
Sayette et al., 2001; Waters et al., 2004). Moreover, West and Ussher
(2010) showed that a brief measure of craving was evenly sensitive
and reliable as a more comprehensive measure. Still, it is important to
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ing its physiological equivalents.
The uncertainties regarding the experimentalmanipulations are also
worth mentioning: Besides the fact that the self-efﬁcacy manipulation
in study2 did not reach the conventional level of signiﬁcance,we cannot
rule out that our manipulations had effects for other reasons than they
were designed for. For example, self-efﬁcacy manipulations may have
increased self-esteem, while the self-afﬁrmation manipulation may
have induced a positive mood. Future research should further check
these possibilities.
A limitation of both studies is related to the samples of participants.
We were interested in craving in recently quitted ex-smokers, but
because of ethical reasons we could not include this group: Seducing
ex-smokers with smoking-cues may lead to relapse. Therefore, we
used temporary abstinent smokers, who were instructed not to smoke
at least four hours before the experiment (unfortunately, no data were
available on whether they actually adhered to this request). The fact
that ‘real’ ex-smokers couldn't be used may have biased the results at
some point. Especiallywith regard to the expectation of our participants
that they were allowed to smoke again after the experiment, they differ
from “real” ex-smokers. On the other hand, our experiment was de-
signed to show differences between manipulations on craving; it is
not immediately clear how the manipulation would work qualitatively
different in “real” ex-smokers.
The present studies provide experimental evidence that craving is
not only determined by automated physiological reactions but also by
the psychological interpretations of smoking-cues. In addition, we
showed that smoking-cues themselves may induce a state of mind –
probably related to coping with the confrontation – that inﬂuences
the perception of the smoking stimuli, and that states of mind interact;
leading to a qualitative different state of mind through which the
smoking-cue is interpreted. Our ﬁndings may also be relevant for
other health behaviors in which craving and self-regulation play a
role, such as, alcohol consumption and dietary behaviors. When it
comes to designing relapse prevention interventions, the observed
phenomenon should be taken into account: Risk situations are not
only deﬁned by the confrontationwith a smoking-cue, or the (smoking)
history of the situation, but also by more short-lived states of mind,
even those not related to smoking. Helping individuals to recognize
and inﬂuence these states of mind might be important to prevent
relapse.
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